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A well-known thought experiment has us ponder a lottery system
that selects one person as the source of transplantable organs for
two others. The organs are forcibly harvested and the “donor” dies,
whereas the other two patients live. The Survival Lottery is supposed
to get at the distinction between killing and letting die, but it is also
a challenge to beliefs about moral duties: what are my obligations
if my life could be used to save yours and another person’s as well?
A less extreme version of this thought experiment might have us
imagining that officials of the public healthcare system would devise a similar lottery in the aftermath of a large-scale medical emergency. We could imagine that a natural disaster or an attack using
biological weapons, for example, has so diminished the ability to
provide public health care that in some communities, officials might
consider implementing a lottery. To avoid the concerns about outright killing of selectees, officials might offer a wide range of participation in medical practice and research, not just organ allocation.
Officials could ensure that no significant risks are involved, and
selectees could in various ways be compensated. Would it be possible to ethically justify this “Healthcare Lottery” on the grounds that
it was a temporary, yet necessary, infringement on autonomy?
Keywords: emergency response, lottery, public health, rationing,
utilitarianism
I. BACKGROUND
Sometime ago, Harris (1975) asked that we envision a “Survival Lottery.” In
this Lottery, one person, called “X,” was to be randomly selected as a source
of transplantable organs for two patients, Y and Z. According to the setting
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that Harris described, those two patients were to have died otherwise, but
with organs taken from X, they were able to leave the hospital healthy instead. This was the memorable twist in Harris’ Lottery. He proposed a onefor-two trade, with selectees being ordered, not asked, to serve. The selectees
were also to view their own deaths as part of an acceptable bargain for the
greater good.1
Harris recognized that his thought experiment would be jarring to many.
As he explained, however, his goal was to raise questions about why, in the
midst of a crisis of sorts concerning scarce organs, we would be so quick to
say that it was wrong to kill X, rather than judging it to be more wrong to
allow Y and Z to die. As Harris put the question, could not most any criticism
that X offered, possibly one referencing the sanctity of life, be made with
equal gusto by Y and Z? A more basic question was also at the heart of Harris’
hypothetical proposal. What are our obligations to each other, and in particular, what do I owe you when I can play a direct role in keeping you alive?
The real value in Harris’ thought experiment is the generality of the questions that he raises. We can apply a framework similar to that in the Survival
Lottery to other speculative moral contexts. We could, for example, set the
thought experiment in the aftermath of a natural disaster, political and economic upheaval, or an attack involving biological weapons. In a widespread
medical emergency, we might ask the same general questions about the relationship between individuals and that between individuals and their public
healthcare system. Predictions of the strain that a terrorist attack, against a
largely unprotected population, would have on the public healthcare system
are not encouraging (e.g., Trotter, 2003).2 Added to the challenge of responding to the immediate, critical casualties (Fry et al., 2005) would be the
prospect that measures taken on even the threat of such an attack might lead
to a prolonged crisis within the healthcare system. Thinking in terms of
something like the Survival Lottery might help us understand how we would
want officials to respond. Regardless of what might bring on the crisis, it
seems reasonable to believe that desperate conditions in the healthcare systems that serve large communities would leave thousands of citizens uninsured or severely underserved. Those conditions could also make it difficult
to treat even the patients who would still have some ability to pay.
Inasmuch as people in either category would continue to make demands
on the healthcare system, whether the crisis resulted from warfare, nature,
market forces, or some other factors, we can imagine scenarios not too far
removed from the one that Harris suggested. We can imagine officials being
forced to make tough choices about rationing and triage, and their response
would be contingent on the resources that the system could procure. This
provides for the test of our moral intuitions concerning the use of a Lottery.
A Lottery could help manage the flow of supplies, patients, and information,
but would such a system be ethical? In these scenarios, the Lottery would not
have to be an instrument of triage or rationing in itself.3 Rather, we could
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imagine the Lottery having a limited role, one of helping officials sustain the
healthcare system in a given community. Could officials justify the Lottery if
it operated alongside preexisting plans for triage and rationing?
II. TINKERING WITH THE SURVIVAL LOTTERY

III. DEFENDING A HEALTHCARE LOTTERY
This might lead some to object that once we start down the road toward
justifying the Healthcare Lottery on the grounds that the few could benefit
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One primary reason for thinking that the Survival Lottery would not be justified holds that the degree of sacrifice Harris calls for is too great. The Survival
Lottery would keep the “pipeline” of organs moving at too high a price, the
critic might say. A larger number of lives could be saved, but only after society abandoned long-standing moral principles, most notably non-maleficence
and respect for autonomy. But what if officials could decrease the sacrifice
that the Lottery requires? They could sharply restrict, or even rule out, forms
of service in the Lottery that would pose a high level of risk. Officials could
then look for corresponding ways to increase the benefits that the Lottery
would provide. They could do this by expanding the program well beyond
organ allocation.
These steps would accomplish two things. Officials would eliminate the intentional killing that characterized Harris’ version of the Lottery and spread the
potential benefits of the system much wider than he envisioned. The refashioned “Healthcare Lottery” could be designed so that it did not call upon
people to dramatically change their lifestyles (Blank, 1988, 120–2). There would
be no need for extreme sacrifice, and people could breathe easier knowing
that, if chosen, they would not have to worry about dying or being disfigured.
Perhaps best of all, selectees in the Healthcare Lottery could have a great deal
of leeway when it came to choosing how they would actually participate.
Selectees could decide according to their own medical needs and the needs
of the healthcare system. This provision would let some selectees serve in clinical trials, whereas others might provide time in administrative roles at nearby
medical facilities. Selectees could sign-up for training in critical care specialties.4 Some who are willing to contribute in high-demand areas (e.g., organ or
tissue donation) might receive vouchers for reduced-fee medical care, either
for themselves or their family members. Naturally, some will be willing only to
participate in minimal form, say, by transporting medical equipment. They
could under this system receive less compensation or be required to serve
more often. In addition to these changes, the underlying utilitarian flavor of the
Survival Lottery could be retained if we stipulated that any benefits related to
X’s service be enjoyed by at least two patients and, ideally, many more.
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the many, we would find ourselves confronting the kind of forced bargains
that Harris discussed in his version of the Lottery. But setting some utilitarian
limits on the exchange of risk and benefit in the Healthcare Lottery would
be consistent with the ethical basis for many aspects of public health. This is
the partial basis for justifying real-world clinical trials, for instance. The trials
are designed to offer the lowest possible risk to patients while providing
maximum benefit to others in a select group. The notion that we must
spread benefits as widely as possible also serves as the ethical foundation for
the triage and rationing schemes. The justification of the Healthcare Lottery
would not stand or fall on the consequentialist requirement. I am not contending that justification would be achieved simply because one person
could benefit at least two others. This would only be part of the case for the
Lottery. There are many values to consider besides the crude accounting of
the numbers of selectees who participate and the number of people who
benefit from their service. The rationale would be that sharply limiting risks,
while spreading the benefits as wide as possible through the system, would
serve as an important moral check on the types of participation that officials
could offer.
A critic might charge that the more freedom of choice that we give selectees, the more we would be developing what amounted to a series of specialized lotteries rather than one general program. It might then look as if the
associated moral liabilities would quickly become so complicated that no
one could know if the results were just. Who would decide which forms of
service should be offered? How would we compare the moral status of the
act of providing stem cells to the act of helping to answer phones at a
walk-in clinic?5
These are relevant concerns, but the advocate for the Lottery can reply
that similar questions about moral complexity can be raised now about the
public healthcare system. As such, there is something unfair about expecting
the Lottery advocate to promise an elimination of injustice and wrongful allocation. Under current conditions, one person can donate fluids or tissues
whereas others donate time or knowledge, and most others do nothing at
all. Equally problematic, some people can afford to pay for a high level of
healthcare, whereas many others (possibly millions) are forced to make do
without even basic checkups. The objection that the Lottery would not offer
a balanced allocation of burdens and benefits is thus not very compelling. At
best, this objection is very incomplete.
The objection is less persuasive once we remember that in the original
thought experiment, Harris’ system only appeared to be streamlined. Harris
argued as if only one resource, organs, would be allocated. In his defense,
Harris was not trying to establish a program for ending the shortage in organs; his goal was to challenge our beliefs about obligation and the linguistic
distinction between killing and “letting die.” Yet there are a number of morally relevant factors that distinguish the act of donating a kidney from a heart
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IV. FORCED RELATIONSHIPS OF MEDICAL CONVENIENCE
Allowing selectees to be very choosey in how they participate would be cold
comfort to those who think that they should not have to make such choices
in the first place. A reformed Lottery might still involve what seems to some
people an unacceptable type of forced “altruism.” The critic might add that
American society has moved away from forced conscription into the military,
for instance, preferring to recruit from true volunteers. This might be true,
but the challenge is to show that something like a military draft is morally
similar to the Healthcare Lottery. It is also not obvious that relying on volunteers in the military is morally preferable to drafting “recruits.” Certainly, it
has not proven to be a way to avoid injustice or even exploitation.6 And no
matter how people enter the military service, it is worth bearing in mind that
the amount of autonomy anyone can exercise once the swearing-in has
taken place is severely limited. The military does not make allowances for
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or a tissue. And it is important to also remember that in Harris’ system no
one would be “donating” in the standard sense of that term.
This means that even in the original Survival Lottery, there would be what
could be considered “micro-lotteries” operating, perhaps many of them if we
consider the variations in things like donor suitability and transplant facilities. The critic is right that the Healthcare Lottery would be complicated. The
system would be morally and bureaucratically complex, to say the least. But
the Survival Lottery is not a great deal simpler, and what simplicity that system seems to have comes largely from the fact that officials would make no
allowances for patient preference, including the preference to go on living.
I am arguing that the Healthcare Lottery would be at least as justified, once
these trade-offs are taking into consideration, as the Survival Lottery.
The Healthcare Lottery looks even better once we consider that the main
arguments against the Survival Lottery cannot be that it would be morally
complex since the complications and mini-lotteries that we are pondering
are in many ways part of standard healthcare systems now. As useful as it is
to debate the merits of one public healthcare system, that system really comprises a number of smaller systems, even within the same community. It is
only moral shorthand, that is, which lets us speak as though two patients in
any two cities, for example, are served by the same healthcare system. In
their respective communities, we would likely find wide variation in the
level of care and even the most basic considerations like access to prescription drugs. These considerations will in turn involve variations in geographic,
economic, and social differences. With proper oversight, a Lottery would not
have to add to the injustice already prevalent. Service could be tailored to
the selectee’s particular healthcare needs and the needs of his or her community. The Healthcare Lottery could, thus, require only the kinds of compromises that people already make regarding public healthcare.
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people to opt out of hazardous duty; those who find ways to avoid this duty
are looked on with suspicion if not legal scrutiny. In some wartime situations, they can be executed.
Control over individual choice would occur in the Healthcare Lottery. Officials could build into the system a series of safeguards so that selectees
would be able to tailor the degree of their participation to their own willingness to take risks. Selectees who misjudged, and found the participation that
they chose too time-consuming or risky, could be given the chance to select
a form of participation more to their liking. Selectees in the Healthcare Lottery would also not be required to relocate or be separated from their families. On the contrary, the Lottery would be designed to provide a range of
benefits at the community level. Having selectees taken away from their community, their jobs, or their families would defeat the purpose of the system.
Another important difference would be that selectees would be chosen at
random, possibly based on criteria that community representatives devised.
Military conscription plans hardly involve the selection of random individuals, and the criteria are not applied universally. Typically, whether it involves
voluntary or forced participation, a system of obtaining military members
will draw upon the young, the healthy, and the male. In contrast, the Healthcare Lottery would cast as wide a net as possible since we are assuming that
there would in a crisis be as much need for pediatric care as there would be
for adult care. In the case of military conscription, the defense of the country
might rest on the sacrifices of those who are still in their teens. In the Healthcare Lottery, all members of the community might participate according to
their ability and in keeping with the specific needs of that community.
Admittedly, the idea that I might be forced to “donate” a pint of blood or
an hour of my time so that two others might benefit would nonetheless set
the Lottery apart from other public health programs. But this is not something that weighs against the Lottery. The quality of healthcare that individual patients receive is often seen as dependant only on their willingness or
ability to pay (Brock, 1986). And as one commentator puts it, “perhaps the
most direct way in which market-justice undermines our resolve to preserve
and protect human life lies in the primary freedom this ethic extends to all
individuals and groups to act with minimal obligations to protect the common good” (Beauchamp, 1976, 2). Entertaining the thought of the Lottery
could help us reverse the usual understanding of obligations to each other
and to the healthcare system.
The thought experiment could help us examine our beliefs about the
intersection of ethical and economic values in healthcare. In the past, the
general focus of discussions in medicine has been on what happens between patients and their doctors. Obligations between patient and patient,
or patient and society, have received far less attention. Headline issues that
lend themselves to political debate have mostly concerned a patient’s ability to make demands on the healthcare system, not vice versa. But recent
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discussions (e.g., Hodges and Gostin, 2003) about the access to care are
merging political, ethical, and medical concerns. Speculation about a Healthcare Lottery would have an obvious place in this new dialogue.
A proponent of the Healthcare Lottery might argue that citizens who depend on the public healthcare system do have at least a provisional right to
care (Wong, 1998). The Healthcare Lottery could help people see that by
insisting on such care they take on a corresponding obligation to provide for
the conditions that they expect the system to provide. The infringement on
autonomy would not be justified solely on the basis of the benefits that the
Lottery would provide these people. But those benefits ca not be ignored in
the moral evaluation either. Only a very extreme position would hold that
no amount of infringement, and no assurances of benefit, would be acceptable. Anyone who held this view would also have to reject trade-offs that
already occur within the public healthcare system under normal circumstances, such as the rationing of resources. Officials tasked with maintaining
the healthcare system in a community or statewide could call upon people
to only reorient their thinking to the degree that the normalcy that the average person would want can be maintained in clinical practice and research.
Local governments typically play this sort of leading role in setting educational priorities and allocating educational responsibilities. Although citizens
have a right to an education for their children, no one pretends that providing
this is “free” in the sense that it is possible without sacrifice from those who
benefit from it. The usual form of sacrifice involves setting aside land for
schools and paying teachers’ salaries. Indeed, service in the programs that
lead to free education is compulsory. Those who have no children are burdened with this obligation, on the assumption that the benefits will be enjoyed by the entire community. Advocates for the Lottery could argue that
under some conditions what one demands from the healthcare system has to
be adjusted in a similar way, according to what one is willing to provide. If
the alternative to the kind of forced service that the Lottery would require is a
gradual inability to offer even the most rudimentary care, our intuitions about
what citizens can be called upon to provide would have to be reassessed.7
Any governmental demand for sacrifice from citizens will have powerful
political implications. But in this case, the demands that authorities would
be making would rest on the belief that the connections that we usually
think exist between free-market healthcare, and the ability to pay are more
complicated than we recognize (Ubel, 2000, 19–28). This is probably true in
the case of providing for childhood education, and it seems especially so if
we embrace the idea that “public health no longer refers to just medical and
health care … [I]ts ubiquitous nature encompasses agriculture, transportation, communication, the judiciary, public safety, economic viability, and
everything else that allows a town, city, or nation-state to function” (Burkle,
2005, 11). Officials would, thus, need to show only that healthcare is of
such a special nature that under emergency conditions it might no longer
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be prudent to rely solely on economic means like bonds or insurance premiums to support it.
In the course of doing this, officials could show that the Lottery would in
fact only make explicit relationships that were not recognized before, relationships similar to those that sustain the educational system in communities.
People who complain about paying taxes can be forgiven if they do not always realize the connection that the money has to benefits that come from
living in a community of educated adults. People with reliable insurance
coverage can be forgiven if they misconstrue the nature of public health, and
the way that we all benefit from having healthy employees, customers, and
neighbors. That an obligation might vary depending on the conditions
and the shared sense of what morality requires is an idea that has affinities
with much of what contractualist ethical thinking suggests (see, e.g.,
Scanlon, 1998, 172–3). But one need not be a contractualist to grant that,
regardless of how much X, Y, and Z have drawn from it in the past, we could
argue that they have always had a common interest in the stability of the
healthcare system.
“The supposed opposition between ethical individualism and sociality is
false,” as another commentator puts it, because “life is irreducibly social, as
well as inexhaustibly individual” (Churchill, 1987, 136). Furthermore, if we
assume that healthcare is a “public good, subsidized by the common treasure” (Lomansky, 1981, 72), it is easier to see the major benefit, however
intangible, in the knowledge that the Lottery might help sustain the healthcare system. This benefit would be important, inasmuch as “hospitals are
symbolic of public preparedness, healthcare leadership, and safety in a community” (McFee, Leikin, and Kiernan, 2002). The relationships that the Lottery would generate between X, Y, and Z would not be artificial or arbitrary.
We already share a common need, advocates might say, one that is both
symbolic and practical, for a given level of healthcare in our communities.
The fact that most everyone would be eligible for service could create a
sense of community involvement, even if all that the system required was a
brief visit to a local clinic. A similar bond is probably established in the way
that people realize that they are eligible jurors. This is despite the fact that at
any one time, relatively few people are called to report to the courthouse
and the fact that service can require days, not minutes, of one’s life. Consider, however, that there is a much narrower process of conscripting selectees for jury service. Unlike the compulsory service on juries, service in the
Healthcare Lottery could also involve representatives who ensure that the
system meets the needs of that community. People selected as potential jurors are allowed hardly any power of consent or choice over their participation. There are also questions about the distribution of benefits from the jury
system. Do the benefits accrue to the juror or the accused? Such doubts
about the distribution of benefits, and the entitlement for them, can undermine the justification of a system in which participation is compulsory. The
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advantage of the Healthcare Lottery would be that, unlike the coerced responsibility that we associate with jury duty, serving in the military, or as
taxpayers, the obligation would end as soon as officials and community representatives agreed that the program was no longer needed.

When he presented the original Survival Lottery, Harris wondered if there
would be “harmful side-effects in terms of terror and distress to victims,
witnesses, and society generally, that would be occasioned by doctors simply snatching passers-by off the streets” (Harris, 1975, 85). Officials would
avoid the brunt of this concern by barring service in the Healthcare Lottery
that posed unusually high risk. Still, would it count for something that
people might suffer psychological stress simply because they understood
that they were now eligible for service as “X”? A related question would ask
what we should make of the prospect that people might have reservations
about placing so much power to conscript individuals in the hands of a few
officials.
Harris argued that such fears should not sway our thinking against the
Survival Lottery. He maintained that people willingly face significant risks
when they drive on crowded highways, so their potential fears about being
selected in Survival Lottery should not be taken as evidence that it is unethical. In Harris’ view, people who accept risks that might be higher than those
associated with the Lottery (on the assumption that one is more likely to be
killed in traffic than selected for the Survival Lottery) cannot consistently
reject the latter. Harris, thus, raises important issues concerning the way we
rank various risks, but his response has never seemed very convincing.
The case for the Healthcare Lottery would have to improve on this thinking. Statistics on traffic deaths are readily available, yet one rarely hears of
phobias or apprehension related to driving fatalities. A plausible way to interpret this would be to conclude that people are comparatively unconcerned about being “selected” in the Traffic Lottery. Teens are not the only
ones who are excited to take to the road or who would describe driving as
one of their most pleasurable activities. Still, why not accept that humans
have fairly elaborate, and not always consistent, ideas about risk? It would
be naive to think that a public program could persuade everyone to simply
replace one risk with another and have the perception of ethical value
smoothly transfer with it. There would be something cruel about our forcing
someone who is terrified of flying to board an airplane, and then defending
our behavior on the grounds that the passenger does in fact take greater
risks driving her car to work each morning.
There may be no way around the possibility that the Healthcare Lottery
would represent a perspective on risks and benefits that not everyone will
share. And a large part of the ethical justification of the system would hinge
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V. AN OBJECTION BASED ON PUBLIC APPREHENSION
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VI. WHY NOT TRADE ONE LIFE FOR TWO?
One last objection would relate to the initial changes that were made to the
Survival Lottery. The critic could accuse officials of having misplaced good
intentions in “softening” the terms of participation. A critic might wonder if it
would make sense to ban any form of service that could lead to the death of
the selectee. Such a ban could, after all, make it difficult to respond to some
extraordinary and rapidly changing conditions, for example. Recognizing
that nearly any form of service could in theory prove to be life-threatening
for some individuals, it still might seem that a ban on service that posed a
clear risks of death would be counterproductive. Would this not leave officials unable to sustain the public healthcare system? In order to uphold this
ban, this de facto safety threshold, it appears that officials would have to
revisit the question at the center of Harris’ argument. Why should be so
quick to reject the intentional death of one person if it presents one way to
prevent the death of at least two others?
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on community leaders being able to adjust the terms of the Lottery, possibly
through small-scale tests of the system, so that citizens could participate
without significant apprehension. People might experience “side effects” if
their only commitment was a required financial payment to Y and Z. Officials could respond to the concerns that people might naturally have about
their own well-being if they provided educational campaigns long before the
implementation of the Lottery. These campaigns could show that the Healthcare Lottery was clearly in people’s best interests. Such outreach could, in
effect, give people must less to be apprehensive about.
We are all probably in the habit of exaggerating the degree of control that
we have over various risk-taking behaviors. With traffic risks, many of us
might reason that we can often live to tell about an auto accident or a brush
with death. Officials might try to build a similar (and more realistic) perception of control into the Healthcare Lottery. They could also respond to public
apprehension by ensuring that oversight bodies find ways to make selections as random as possible, limited to those who are truly able to serve and
matching service to need. It is worth noting that there is no practical way to
stop participating in the traffic lottery. Not only that, it is in most cases illegal
to attempt to duck one’s obligation in the systems governing jury duty or
taxation. Also noteworthy is the fact that your getting into traffic patterns
each morning on the way to work will not usually have an immediate benefit for two other strangers. In these and other respects, the Healthcare Lottery stands in contrast to obligatory systems already in place. Still, the point
would be that officials could show that the imposition associated with
the Lottery would compare favorably to the kinds of demands made on individuals in other areas, even taking into consideration the different riskbenefit outcomes.
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VII. CLOSING THOUGHTS
Readers jaded by hypothetical dilemmas involving runaway trolleys (where
we choose how many bystanders to crash into and how many to avoid), and
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On this point, Harris (1978, his later work) and others are correct: we do
need to reexamine the conventional reasoning about killing and letting die.
It would be a good idea to look for ways to structure reforms around a reorientation of these ideas. Still, the weeks and months following a disaster
would hardly be the ideal time to ask the public to reassess its stance on
killing. In addition, there is no reason to believe that the purpose of the
healthcare system is or should be to save as many lives as possible, without
regard for what this would require. I am assuming that one of the purposes
of the healthcare system would be to provide a certain level of medical care
and training. I am assuming that the system could do so in a way that causes
the least conflict with a given community’s moral principles. Acts such as
intentional killing would have no room in this model of healthcare.
As we have seen, the Lottery would require the type of temporary compromises and inconveniences that we find in many other public programs. This
means that there would have to be the usual type of deal struck according to
community standards and perceptions about the number of acceptable deaths.
But tough choices about these things are part of many public programs.
People in charge of determining traffic rules and road designs seek compromise between what can be ethically justified as being in society’s best interests and what people might accept, for instance. Traffic laws can be made so
strict that traffic fatalities would almost become a thing of the past. Yet officials who tried to do this might find themselves confronting new problems,
including those related to standards of living and healthcare (Elvik, 1999).
This means that adjustments to traffic regulations become judgments about
mortality. And we can not easily keep such judgments separate from judgments about which principles must give way when a larger goal seems to require this. There is a lesson in the fact that what drivers accept as justified
impositions on their freedom will vary according to changes in pavement conditions or traffic volume. In much the same way, we could suppose that healthcare officials could determine where that threshold stands when it comes to
the number of people that would have to be selected in the Lottery. There
would be no justification for types of service that would be so demanding that
large numbers of people would avoid service or that community principles
would be violated. The deaths of each Y and Z might be “preventable” only in
the trivial sense that would be nothing logically necessary about their dying. In
ethical terms, there might be nothing anyone could do to prevent those deaths
short of changes so radical in our thinking that we would raise questions about
our ability to uphold values that were as important, if not more so.
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NOTES
1. Harris meant to raise doubts about our understanding of moral obligations, not the state of medical knowledge. In a later discussion, Harris (1980) discusses the question of how likely it would be that Y
and Z would really be saved by X’s organs. However, contrived the scenario of saving the two patients
might at first seem, this could serve to make the case for the lottery. One could argue, that is, that the state
of medical science is a direct result of the amount of public participation in research. According to this
thinking, with so few organs to go around we should not be surprised that researchers shy away from the
type of experimentation that could improve knowledge of surgical techniques or the immune system.
2. The literature on this topic is of course prone to political interpretation. But discussions that
avoid alarmism nonetheless offer bleak accounts of where healthcare readiness is and where it needs to
go (see, e.g., Mann, MacKenzie, and Anderson, 2004).
3. On some accounts, triage necessarily includes some features that might resemble those of a “lottery” in any case (Iserson and Pesik, 2003), but I will not assume that the use of the Healthcare Lottery
would be dependent on any one plan of triage or allocation. Clearly, it would be more conducive to
certain plans than others, but the justification that I envision is meant to be as general as possible.
4. Rescher (1969) considers whether we might allocate scarce medical resources to patients willing
to enroll in experiments unrelated to their health, but there seems no reason to raise the requirements for
patients. The usual risk-benefit criteria might still apply to service as an experimental subject in the
Healthcare Lottery.
5. Relying on random selection will still, of course, raise questions about why a particular individual was obligated to participate, and why benefits would go to a specific person and not another, for
instance (on this, see Locke, 1982, 334–5). There would also be the utilitarian uncertainty of knowing
where to draw the lines between what level of benefits (or resources) is owed someone, as opposed to
what it would be “saintly” for another to provide. The justification of the Lottery could aim for the modest
goal of seeing that random selection helped avoid at least some of the usual challenges based on justice
or unequal treatment among selectees.
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“Sophie’s Choice” settings (where we decide which innocent people to kill,
who should do the killing, etc.), might be quick to dismiss scenarios like that
described in the original Survival Lottery. But there are reasons not to regard
Harris’ general idea as being yet another far-fetched exercise in utilitarian
reasoning.8 There are reasons to refashion the concept of forced public participation into a Healthcare Lottery. The thought experiment could help us
reflect on common interests that people have in public health and the maintenance of individual liberty.
Were we to imagine ways that the Healthcare Lottery might actually be
implemented, we would of course want to leave room for rapid change, according to information about the effects of the system on public health and
attitudes. We would not have to imagine the Lottery becoming a permanent
part of any community healthcare system. We would not have to imagine the
Lottery being in competition with other public programs either. As one tool
available to planners, something like a Healthcare Lottery could play an important role in seeing citizens and the healthcare system through a crisis.
Hence, although reliance on forced participation would require continual
oversight, the costs from this imposition could be kept fairly low. Given
enough time to plan the program, and sufficient community involvement,
officials might achieve a utilitarian compromise similar or even better than
those associated with other public institutions and programs.

Healthcare Lottery

193

REFERENCES
Beauchamp, D. E. 1976. Public health as social justice. Inquiry 1313–14.
Brock, D. W. 1986. The value of prolonging human life. Philosophical Studies 50:401–28.
Burkle, F. M. 2005. Integrating international responses to complex emergencies, unconventional war, and terrorism. Critical Care Medicine 33:7–12.
Churchill, L. R. 1987. Rationing health care in America: Perceptions and principles of justice.
Notre Dame University.
Elster, J. 1992. Local justice: How institutions allocate scarce goods and necessary burdens.
NY: Russell Sage Foundation Press.
Elvik, R. 1999. Can injury prevention efforts go to far? Accident Analysis and Prevention
31:265–86.
Fry, D. E., W. P. Schecter, J. S. Parker, and E. J. Quebbeman. 2005. The surgeon and acts of civilian
terrorism: Biologic agents. Journal of the American College of Surgeons 200(2):291–302.
Gostin, L. O. 2003. When terrorism threatens health: How far are limitations on personal and
economic liberties justified? Florida Law Review 55:1105–70.
Hardin, R. 2004. Civil liberties in the era of mass terrorism. Journal of Ethics 8:77–95.
Harris, J. 1975. The survival lottery. Philosophy 50:81–7.
———. 1978. Hanink on the survival lottery. Philosophy 53:100–1.
———. 1980. Violence and responsibility. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Hedgecoe, R. 1988. Rationing Medicine. NY: Columbia University Press.
Hodges, J. G., and L. O. Gostin. 2003. Protecting the public’s health in an era of bioterrorism:
The model state emergency health powers act. In In the wake of terror: Medicine and
morality in a time of crisis (pp. 17–32), ed. J. Moreno. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Iserson, K. V., and N. Pesik. 2003. Ethical resource distribution after biological, chemical, or
radiological terrorism. Cambridge Quarterly Healthcare Ethics 12:455–65.
Locke, D. 1982. The choice between Lives. Philosophy 57:453–75.
Lomansky, L. E. 1981. Medical progress and national health care. Philosophy & Public Affairs
10:65–88.
Mann, N. C., E. MacKenzie, and C. Anderson. 2004. Public health preparedness for masscasualty events: A state-by-state assessment. Prehospital Disaster Medicine 19:245–55.

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jmp/article/34/2/181/1005038 by montclair state university user on 28 June 2022
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a lottery and justice, not necessarily the same justice, emerges from the system (see especially p. 126). As
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72). See also Morillo (1976), who compares the military draft to the original Survival Lottery. One of the central
features of any lottery would be the randomness of the allocation of risks and rewards, not the number of
people who actually participate. But an oversight committee could ensure that the Healthcare Lottery reached
the largest possible cross-section of the community and still maintained randomness in the selection.
7. Hardin (2004) makes a strong case for not looking to ordinary moral discourse to resolve the
moral dilemmas that a terrorist attack would pose. His point might apply as well regardless of the source
of the disruption to the healthcare system.
8. One of the most common criticisms of such scenarios is that they cannot overcome the “alienating” feature of utilitarianism. The utilitarian wrongly expects, say critics, that we can distance ourselves
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(Railton, 1984, 162). It is unclear that the Healthcare Lottery would be subject to this criticism as it relies
on more communal values than usual for this type of thought experiment.
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